No, Dr. Onyereri—Emergency Powers Do Not Sanction Constitutional Subversion: A Response to the Rejoinder
Rt. Hon. Linus Okorie
Dr. Onyereri’s response to my to my earlier critique of his initial piece titled “Dismantling the False Narrative of a ‘Coup’ in Rivers State,” is elegant, thoughtful, and rhetorically compelling—but ultimately rests on a troubling premise: that constitutional ambiguity and the urgency of crisis combined legitimize the practical displacement of elected institutions in the name of national stability.
This is not merely a misreading of Section 305 of the constitution—it is a dangerous flirtation with authoritarian logic sweetened as pragmatic governance.
Let us begin where we both agree: the Constitution is not omniscient. It cannot anticipate every crisis.
Dr. Jones Onyereri
But its silence on a matter as grave as removing or disempowering elected officials is not an invitation for improvisation—it is a warning against it.
The absence of explicit authorization for such radical action is precisely because the framers understood the risks of concentrating emergency power without limit. The is more so when section 188 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) clearly outlines specific legal and procedural paths through which a state governor can be removed from office.
Dr. Onyereri invokes Section 14(2)(b)—“the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government”—as if this aspirational clause can be wielded as a carte blanche to override the core tenets of representative democracy. But Section 14 is a guiding principle, not an operative license. It does not—and cannot—supersede the structural provisions of the Constitution; including section 188 highlighted above. To elevate it as justification for suspending democratic governance is to mistake purpose for power.
The argument that elected officials may “retain titles while ceding operational control” is a constitutional sleight of hand. Titles without authority are fig leaves.
This is not preservation of democracy—it is a Potemkin village of legality. No provision in Section 305 permits the federal government or the President to usurp or sideline state executives under emergency powers. The Constitution envisions support, not substitution.
Moreover, the invocation of the doctrine of necessity is revealing. This doctrine, by its very nature, is extralegal—it operates outside the boundaries of the Constitution and is only ever reluctantly acknowledged in jurisprudence to explain (not justify) momentary lapses in legality under extreme duress. But to codify necessity as a principle of governance is to normalize illegality under the veil of pragmatism.
Dr. Onyereri appeals to outcomes:
Did the intervention work? Did it restore order? But this is consequentialism in its most corrosive form. A coup that “works” is still a coup. Legitimacy in a constitutional democracy is not measured by efficiency, but by fidelity to process. Once we allow success to validate subversion, we open the floodgates to every future strongman who promises order over law.; exactly what “coupists” do each time they strike.
And what of the claim that “strict procedural purity” is a luxury Nigeria cannot afford? This is precisely the logic that has historically excused executive overreach, military intervention, and systemic impunity. The fragility of Nigeria’s federalism is not a reason to abandon constitutional order—rather the reason to protect it, even—especially—when it is inconvenient.
The judiciary’s eventual review and the National Assembly’s oversight are cold comforts if the constitutional breach has already metastasized into precedent. By then, the damage is done. This reminds us of similar abnormality in 2003 during the Obasanjo Presidency in Plateau and Ekiti; often cited as precedence by defenders of the present misstep. But even in those instances, the Sole Administrators did not dismantle democratic structures or impugn the law as Ibas is presently undertaking in Rivers state of today.
To now seek to normalize such interventions is to plant the seeds of future abuses that may not come dressed in national interest, but in crass partisan ambition.
In sum, Dr. Onyereri’s argument is less a legal defense than a moral rationalization. It asks us to suspend our constitutional skepticism in the name of crisis management. But democracies do not die by loud explosions; they die by quiet exceptions. And if we concede that democratic institutions can be sidestepped “just this once” because of failure, then we must also concede that every political failure can be recast as a justification for intervention; and several failures abound in many states across the country.
Let us be clear: the Rivers intervention was not just unconstitutional, it was obviously unwise. And no matter how noble the stated intentions, it should not be allowed to stand as precedent. The Constitution must be interpreted through its text, not through the fog of crisis or the allure of expedience. The health of our democracy depends not just on outcomes—but on the means we use to reach them.
Let us not forget: the law is not always convenient. But it is always necessary.
We must be vigilant. We must be lawful. Above all, let us never confuse emergency with license!
Rt. Hon. Linus Okorie, FCA, FCAI
Former Chairman, House of Representatives Committee on Agricultural Colleges & Institutions