By Rt. Hon. Dr. Jones Onyereri
Let me begin by stating unequivocally: democracy is not a suicide pact. The framers of our Constitution, in their wisdom, embedded provisions like Section 305 precisely to prevent the collapse of governance during existential crises. Rt. Hon. Linus Okorie’s essay, though rhetorically charged, suffers from selective constitutional interpretation, conflates temporary emergency measures with permanent authoritarianism, and substitutes legal reasoning for political sensationalism. His characterization of the Rivers State emergency as a “civilian coup” is not only hyperbolic but dangerously dismissive of the constitutional mechanisms designed to save democracies from self-destruction.
The National Assembly’s Prerogative to Conditionally Approve Emergencies
Okorie’s fixation on the National Assembly’s modifications to the emergency proclamation betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of legislative oversight. Section 305(6)(c) mandates the legislature to *approve or disapprove* a state of emergency, but it does not—and cannot—constrain lawmakers from imposing conditions to prevent executive abuse. This is not “rewriting” the proclamation; it is exercising due diligence. The National Assembly’s role as a check on emergency powers has precedent. During the 2011 emergency in Borno and Yobe, the Senate imposed reporting requirements and funding restrictions on military operations. If such conditional approvals were unconstitutional, the judiciary would have intervened long ago. The truth is, the legislature’s adjustments in Rivers State reflect democratic accountability, not illegality.
On Budgets, Caretakers, and Constitutional Necessity
The Sole Administrator’s preparation of a budget has been misrepresented as a legislative coup. This argument ignores context. Under Section 305(3)(e), the President may *“make regulations and take measures necessary to restore order.”* When a state legislature is paralyzed—as Rivers’ Assembly was, following the factional crisis that predated the emergency—basic governance cannot grind to a halt. A budget in this context is not a “law” but an administrative instrument to fund salaries, hospitals, and security. To equate this with usurping legislative power is to ignore the doctrine of necessity, which our courts have repeatedly invoked to sustain governance during crises (*Lakami v. Attorney-General of the Federation, 1985*). The alternative—allowing public institutions to collapse—would be the greater constitutional betrayal.
Temporary Measures vs. Permanent Dismantling
Okorie’s outrage over the dissolution of the Rivers State Independent Electoral Commission (RSIEC) and local councils overlooks the temporality of emergency rule. Yes, Section 7(1) guarantees democratically elected local governments—but only under “normal” circumstances. When a state is in freefall, the Constitution permits the federal government to stabilize it. The appointment of caretakers is a stopgap, not a permanent dissolution. Similar measures were applied in Plateau State in 2004, where an emergency administrator oversaw local councils for six months before elections resumed. To claim this violates federalism is to ignore the hierarchy of constitutional values: survival of the state precedes ideological purity.
The “Wike Factor” and the Poverty of Speculation
Political conspiracies may titillate, but they obscure legal analysis. Okorie insinuates that the emergency benefits Minister Nyesom Wike, yet he offers no evidence beyond coincidence. Let us be clear: emergency measures are not tailored to individual politicians but to systemic breakdowns. If the Sole Administrator has replaced officials linked to instability, it is because their actions—not their affiliations—warranted it. To reduce a constitutional process to political theater is to disrespect the intelligence of Rivers people. If Governor Fubara’s allies are aggrieved, the courts remain open.
The False Bogeyman of Federal Takeover
The claim that Rivers State heralds a “precedent” for federal overreach is fearmongering. Section 305 is not a Trojan horse; it is a narrowly framed provision. The emergency lasts 180 days, renewable *only* with National Assembly approval. The judiciary retains full authority to strike down unconstitutional actions (*AG Abia v. AG Federation, 2002*). The Governor remains in office, and the House of Assembly retains its powers once security is restored. To compare this to a “coup” is to trivialize the very concept. Coups dismantle institutions; emergencies repair them.
Conclusion: Vigilance, Not Alarmism
Nigeria’s democracy is imperfect, but it is not so fragile that a lawful emergency intervention—overseen by the legislature and reviewable by the courts—qualifies as dictatorship. Okorie’s essay, while well-intentioned, risks inflaming tensions in Rivers State by framing legal processes as existential threats. The real danger lies not in the emergency itself but in the erosion of public trust when elites weaponize terms like “coup” to derail constitutional remedies.
Let us channel our energies into holding the Sole Administrator accountable, demanding timelines for restoration, and preparing for post-emergency elections. Rivers State will survive this crisis—not by abandoning the Constitution, but by using every tool within it.
Rt. Hon. Dr. Jones Onyereri, KSP, FCIPAN
Former Member, House of Representatives Committee on Banking and Currency